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I. INTRODUCTION 
The federal judiciary is a branch of the federal government and 
“it would be a mistake to forget that whenever governmental 
power is wielded, politics is present.”1 
 
For the better half of the last decade, many politicians have adopted 
rhetoric expressing their desire to reduce judicial decisions that “tear at 
the moral fabric of our nation, disregard the will of the people and force 
a corrupt ideology upon our society.”2  As Congress applies this pressure, 
the United States’ Ninth Circuit “feels the squeeze.”  In November of 
2005, the Ninth Circuit survived the most successful legislative attempt 
at its division.3  However, efforts to split the nation’s largest federal 
circuit continue to resurface.4 
In March of 2007, before a House Financial Services 
Appropriations Subcommittee, Justices Kennedy and Thomas testified on 
splitting the Ninth Circuit.5  In exploring the unique issues this circuit 
presents, Justice Kennedy proclaimed that “you don’t design a circuit 
around [politics] . . . . That would be quite wrong. You design it for other 
objective, neutral, and efficient reasons.”6  However, the history 
surrounding the United State’s federal judicial circuits speaks to the 
contrary. 
Confronted with the politics surrounding the Ninth Circuit debate, 
Justice Kennedy declared what he and his fellow justices believe to be 
                                                                                                             
 1 DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH 
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM ix (Yale University 
Press 1988). 
 2 See Renzi Bill Will Remove Arizona from Jurisdiction of Ninth Circuit Court, 
available at http://www.house.gov/hensarling/RSC/doc/Renzi-Porter—9th%20Circuit 
.pdf (last visited November 3, 2009). 
 3 The House passed a bill that would have split the Ninth Circuit, but Congress 
adjourned before the Senate considered the legislation. See Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005, H.R. 4241, 109th Congress (2005). 
 4 See e.g., Circuit Court of Appeals Restructuring and Modernization Act of 2007, S. 
525, 110th Congress (2007) (proposing to split the Ninth Circuit in two; leave the Ninth 
Circuit composed of California, Guam, Hawaii, and Northern Mariana Islands; and create 
a new Twelfth Circuit, composed of Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, 
and Washington). 
 5 See United States House of Representatives, Rehberg: Ninth Circuit’s Size Leaves 
Montana Out, http://www.house.gov/list/press/mt00_rehberg/030907_9thCircuit.html 
(March 9, 2007). 
 6 Id. (quoting Justice Kennedy’s testimony from the hearing of the House Financial 
Services Appropriations Subcommittee). 
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the proper motivations for initiating change. 7  They fail to acknowledge, 
however, that throughout history, political contexts often colored 
changes to the circuit system.8  The federal judiciary is a branch of the 
federal government and “it would be a mistake to forget that whenever 
governmental power is wielded, politics is present.”9 
I. BACKGROUND 
Throughout history, the United States strived to meet the demands 
of a nation growing socially, politically, economically and culturally.10 
To do so, the federal government utilized its judicial branch, including a 
system of judicial circuits.11  Whether on a large or small scale, changes 
to this circuit system have become relatively common occurrences; the 
proposed division of the Ninth Circuit stands as the latest example of a 
general historic trend to divide the circuits based on a variety of factors, 
including those of a political nature.12 
A.  Judiciary Act of 1789 
During the Constitutional Convention, as delegates debated 
desirable structures for a unifying government, discourse regarding a 
federal judiciary focused on two plans, both of which recognized and 
accepted the idea of a United States Supreme Court.13  The point of 
contention between the plans was the establishment of a system of 
inferior (or lower) courts; delegates opposed a system of lower courts 
because they feared “states would ‘revolt’ at such encroachments [on 
their power].”14  Ultimately, a desire to ensure ratification of the United 
States Constitution produced a final version that authorized the 
establishment of a Supreme Court and “deferr[ed,] to the discretion of 
Congress[,] the issue regarding inferior courts.”15 
During its first session, the First United States Congress achieved 
what the Constitutional Convention failed to do directly.16  Through the 
                                                                                                             
 7 Id. (Justice Thomas explaining that he thinks “the comments made by Justice 
Kennedy are generally shared [by members of the Supreme Court]”). 
 8 See infra pp. 2–20. 
 9 See BARROW & WALKER, supra note 1. 
 10 See infra  Part II. 
 11 See infra Part II. 
 12 See infra  Part II. 
 13 See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 19 (Oceana 
Publications, Inc. 2d ed. 2002) (1987). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
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Judiciary Act of 1789, a Federalist-controlled Congress established a 
system of lower federal courts.17  This system encompassed two tiers of 
trial courts: district courts, each with its own district judge; and circuit 
courts, without judges of their own.18  Each state comprised a single 
district, with the exception of Massachusetts and Virginia (each with 
two),19 and Congress divided the country into three circuits: the Eastern 
Circuit,20 the Middle Circuit,21 and the Southern Circuit.22 
Without their own judges, circuit courts “consist[ed] of two 
Supreme Court Justices and one of the district judges of the circuit, 
which was to sit twice a year in the various districts comprising the 
circuit.”23  It was this concept of Supreme Court Justices sitting on circuit 
courts, referred to as circuit riding, which became emblematic of “a 
fierce party strife.”24 
To Republicans, circuit riding brought back an all-too-familiar past. 
Supreme Court justices represented the national government “as the 
English judges on the assizes represent[ed] the King.”25  With the belief 
that “state courts could and should decide all cases at the trial level,”26 
Republicans perceived the lower federal courts as “a political adjunct of 
the hated Federalists,”27 whose ideology centered on an expansive 
federal government.28  Now, as circuit courts became a symbol “of the 
new nation, which would evoke and foster the attachments of the people 
to the still tenuous Union,”29 Republicans “saw Federalists as 
monarchists and consolidators.”30 
                                                                                                             
 17 See id. 
 18 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WELCHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 28 (5th ed. 2003). 
 19 Judiciary Act of 1789, § 2, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). 
 20 Id. (consisting of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut and New York). 
 21 Id. (consisting of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia). 
 22 Id. (consisting of South Carolina and Georgia). 
 23 See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 11 (The Macmillan Company 1928). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See SURRENCY, supra note 13, at 2. 
 26 Henry J. Bourguignon, The Federal Key to the Judiciary Act of 1789, 46 S.C. L. 
REV. 647, 655 (1995)  (“Appeal[s] to the Supreme Court would suffice to assure 
protection of federal rights and to assure uniform interpretation of federal law . . . 
creating lower federal courts would only burden the Constitution with unnecessary 
obstacles in its path to adoption by the states.”). 
 27 See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23. 
 28 LARRY SCHEIKART & MICHAEL ALLEN, A PATRIOT’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES: FROM COLUMBUS’ GREAT DISCOVERY TO THE WAR ON TERROR 145 (Sentinel 
2007). 
 29 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 19. “Circuit riding ‘[kept] the Federal 
Judiciary in touch with the local communities,’ and ‘brought home to the people of every 
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B.  The Midnight Judges Act 
From 1789 to 1801, circuit riding faced increasing scrutiny from 
Federalists and Republicans as both inefficient and an inconvenience to 
the Supreme Court justices.31  Changing political winds, however, 
clouded the need for reform; local prejudices towards the enforcement of 
federal laws began to challenge the expansion of the national 
government32 and impending elections threatened Federalist control of 
Congress and the Presidency.33  Confronted with this adversity, shifts in 
policy began to occur which were no longer based on objective 
principles of government, but on “concrete manifestation[s] of a . . . far-
reaching political division.”34  Federalists began to look toward 
protecting the judiciary from Republicans and ensuring their presence in 
judgeships.35 
In 1801, Federalists lost control of both Congress and the 
Presidency,36 and the judicial branch became the “party’s last bastion.”37  
Political expediency motivated the “lame duck” Federalist Congress to 
enact their expansion of the federal judiciary via the “Midnight Judges 
Act.”38  The Act expanded the federal judiciary by redrawing the nation 
                                                                                                             
state a sense of national judicial power through the presence of the Supreme Court 
Justices.’ Through grand-jury charges widely reprinted in the newspapers, the justices 
could lecture the local citizens not only on the relevant law, but also on the nature of 
centralized government, the responsibility of the citizenry, and the ways in which the new 
government served their needs. Favorable public opinion was necessary to ensure the 
survival of the young Republic and the active and visible presence of the justices would 
help foster loyalty toward the new form of government and somewhat weaken the 
people’s previous allegiance to their state’s government.”  Joshua Glick, On the Road: 
The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1753, 1760 
(2003) (citations omitted). 
 30 DWIGHT WILEY JESSUP, REACTION AND ACCOMMODATION: THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL CONFLICTS 55 (Garland, 1987). 
 31 FALLON, supra note 18, at 34; FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 22–24. 
As the country expanded, an increasing volume of Supreme Court appellate business 
intensified the burdens presented by circuit riding.  FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 
23, at 23. 
 32 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 23. 
 33 See id. at 26. 
 34 Id. 
 35 ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, FEDERAL COURTS 16 (3rd ed. Congressional 
Quarterly Inc., 1998) (1987). 
 36 See SURRENCY, supra note 13, at 27. 
 37 JOHN V. ORTH, JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 31 (Oxford University 
Press 1987). 
 38 THOMAS BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF 
APPEALS 4 (West Publishing Co. 1994). 
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into six circuits39 and eliminating circuit riding (creating circuit 
judgeships).40  In the eyes of Republicans, the “Midnight Judges Act” 
was a “conspiracy;”41 it nearly doubled the number of federal judges and 
ensured that new appointees would be Federalists.42 
C.  Judiciary Act of 1802 
In 1802, the new Republican Congress reacted to the “Midnight 
Judges Act,” passing the Judiciary Act of 1802,43 which appeared equally 
as “politically tinged” to the Federalists.44  Under the 1802 Act, while the 
number of judicial circuits remained at six, a reorganization of circuit 
boundaries (aimed at reducing Federalist influence) left Ohio, Tennessee, 
Maine and Kentucky out of the circuit system.45  Furthermore, the Act 
reestablished circuit riding, “with one justice and one district court judge 
sitting on each of the six circuit courts.”46  Although circuit courts did 
not require a justice’s attendance,47 with the number of circuits equal to 
the number of justices, the creation of a new circuit now required the 
appointment of a new justice.48 
D.  Judiciary Act of 1807 
By 1807, demands on the federal judiciary increased; the expansion 
of Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee necessitated the creation of a new 
                                                                                                             
 39 The First Circuit consisted of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode 
Island; the Second Circuit consisted of Connecticut, Vermont, and New York; the Third 
Circuit consisted of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware; the Fourth Circuit 
consisted of Maryland and Virginia; the Fifth Circuit consisted of North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Georgia; and the Sixth Circuit consisted of Tennessee, Kentucky, and Ohio. 
Judiciary Act of 1801, § 6, 2 Stat. 89 (1801) (repealed 1802). 
 40 Judiciary Act of 1801, § 4, 2 Stat. 89 (1801) (repealed 1802). 
 41 SURRENCY, supra note 13, at 30. 
 42 BAKER, supra note 38, at 4. 
 43 Id.; Judiciary Act of 1802, 2 Stat. 156 (1802). 
 44 JESSUP, supra note 30 at 52. 
 45 The First Circuit consisted of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island; 
the Second Circuit consisted of Connecticut, Vermont, and New York; the Third Circuit 
consisted of New Jersey and Pennsylvania; the Fourth Circuit consisted of Maryland and 
Delaware; the Fifth Circuit consisted of Virginia and North Carolina; and the Sixth 
Circuit consisted of South Carolina and Georgia. Judiciary Act of 1802, § 4, 2 Stat. 156 
(1802). 
 46 BAKER, supra note 38, at 4. 
 47 The Judiciary Act of 1802 authorized a single district judge to sit as a circuit court. 
Judiciary Act of 1802, § 4, 2 Stat. 156 (1802) (“when only one of the judges . . . directed 
to hold the circuit courts, shall attend, such circuit court may be held by the judge so 
attending”). 
 48 BAKER, supra note 38, at 4. 
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circuit.49  In response, Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1807.50  
With the size of the Supreme Court intertwined with judicial circuits, this 
creation of a seventh circuit triggered the appointment of a seventh 
justice.51 
After adding a seventh circuit, Congress was unable to agree on 
expanding the circuit system for over twenty years.52  Several states 
entered the Union during this period, but remained out of the circuit 
court system:53 Louisiana in 1812, 54 Indiana in 1816,55 Mississippi in 
1817,56 Illinois in 1818,57 Alabama in 1819,58 Missouri in 1821,59 and 
Arkansas in 1836.60  Theorizing that this stalemate was the product of 
political hostilities is largely “surmise;” however, one can presume this 
on the mere fact that all parties recognized a need for judicial 
reorganization, though the necessity never translated into action.61 
E.  Judiciary Act of 1837 
By the mid 19th century, the South found itself devoted to (and 
ultimately dependent on) slave-based agricultural systems,62 while 
                                                                                                             
 49 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 34. 
 50 Judiciary Act of 1807, 2 Stat. 420 (1807). 
 51 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 34. 
 52 BAKER, supra note 38, at 5. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Act of April 8, 2 Stat. 701 (1812) (Louisiana congressionally admitted into the 
Union); 2 Stat. 703 (1812) (Louisiana erected one judicial district with a district judge 
who exercised circuit court jurisdiction.). 
 55 Act of April 19, 3 Stat. 289 (1816) (Indiana congressionally admitted into the 
Union); Act of March 3, 3 Stat. 390 (1817) Indiana erected one judicial district with a 
district judge who exercised circuit court jurisdiction.). 
 56 Act of March 1, 3 Stat. 348 (1817) (Mississippi congressionally admitted into the 
Union); Act of April 3, 3 Stat. 413 (1818) (Mississippi erected one judicial district with a 
district judge who exercised circuit court jurisdiction.). 
 57 Act of April 18, 3 Stat. 428 (1818) (Illinois congressionally admitted into the 
Union); Act of March 3, 3 Stat. 502 (1819) (Illinois erected one judicial district with a 
district judge who exercised circuit court jurisdiction.). 
 58 Act of March 2, 3 Stat. 489 (1819) (Alabama congressionally admitted into the 
Union); Act of April 21, 3 Stat. 564 (1820) (Alabama erected one judicial district with a 
district judge who exercised circuit court jurisdiction.). 
 59 Act of March 6, 3 Stat. 645 (1820) (Missouri congressionally admitted into the 
Union); Act of March 16, 3 Stat. 653 (1822) (Missouri erected one judicial district with a 
district judge who exercised circuit court jurisdiction.). 
 60 Act of June 15, 5 Stat. 50 (1836) (Arkansas congressionally admitted into the 
Union); Act of June 15, 5 Stat. 50 (1836) (Arkansas erected one judicial district with a 
district judge who exercised circuit court jurisdiction.). 
 61 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 42. 
 62 HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE 
ISSUES IN THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 56 (Univ. Chi. Press 1982) (1959). 
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Northern states embraced new economic opportunities created by the 
industrial revolution.63  As the West expanded, the potential for an 
increased number of slave states in the Union threatened Northern 
economies that were unable to compete against the endless free labor 
provided by slavery.64  These conflicting economies ultimately led to 
conflicting political interests.65  As Northern states relied on the federal 
government for regulations to promote and protect their infant 
industries,66 Southern states opposed such regulations, believing they 
would come at the expense of their agricultural economy.67 
The Judiciary Act of 1837 divided the country into nine circuits.68  
The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits remained 
unaltered from the Judiciary Act of 1802; Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and 
Michigan formed the Seventh Circuit; Kentucky, Tennessee and 
Missouri formed the Eighth Circuit; and Louisiana Mississippi and 
Arkansas formed the Ninth Circuit.69  The product of this new division 
was a disproportionate southern influence; the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits all consisted exclusively of slave states.70  
Furthermore, with the Supreme Court tied to the circuit system, what 
resulted was a Court increased to nine and dominated by Southern 
justices.71  The sectional imbalance created by the Judiciary Act of 1837 
was no secret72 and aroused suspicions of a conspiracy to preserve 
southern interests.73 
While legislators proposed measures of reform to restructure the 
circuits,74 congressional representatives often hinted toward “dark, 
                                                                                                             
 63 See GEOFFREY WARD, THE CIVIL WAR 11 (Vintage Books 1994). 
 64 See DAVID WILLIAMS, A PEOPLES’ HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR: STRUGGLES FOR 
THE MEANING OF FREEDOM 45-46 (New Press 2006). 
 65 See id. 
 66 HARRY HANSEN, THE CIVIL WAR: A HISTORY 14–18 (Signet Classics 2002). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Judiciary Act of 1837, 5 Stat. 176 (1837). 
 69 Id. 
 70 STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 14–17 
(Univ. of Chi. Press 1968). 
 71 Id. 
 72 See id. at 14–15. 
 73 “Two months before the Dred Scott decision, Representative Benjamin Stanton of 
Ohio proposed a reorganization of the circuits, but to no avail. Stanton advocated reform 
primarily on practical grounds. . . . Given the vast litigation in commercial, admiralty and 
patent law in the Second Circuit, Stanton probably was correct.”  KUTLER, supra note 70, 
at 15. “Three years later, Representative James M. Ashley, also from Ohio . . . contended 
that in certain instances, southern senators had blocked appointments for northern circuits 
when they believed the nominee [was] antagonistic to the expansion of slavery.”  Id. 
 74 Benjamin Stanton of Ohio proposed a reorganization of the circuits. See id. 
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conspiratorial factors . . . operat[ing] to assure a federal government 
favorable to slavery interests.”75  In the 1857 Dred Scott decision, the 
Supreme Court denied Congress the power to prohibit slavery in new 
territories.76  Proclaiming “a house divided against itself cannot stand,” 
Lincoln charged that there was a conspiracy afoot to spread slavery 
throughout the territories.77  Lincoln labeled Southerners as “an 
unscrupulous group” who manipulated the federal government to 
advance their agenda.78 
F.  Tenth Circuit Act 
The existing sectional imbalance, highlighted by the Supreme 
Court’s Dred Scott decision, signaled the need for change.79  On 
December 3, 1861, in his first annual message to Congress, President 
Lincoln proposed improving the efficiency of the judicial system.80 
Lincoln advocated several initiatives, from eliminating circuit riding to 
eliminating circuit courts altogether.81  However, in 1862, in the midst of 
the Civil War, events took place that were “filled with gloom and 
foreboding for the nation.”82  With his wartime initiatives having “a 
chilling effect on political dissent” and Democrats labeling his 
administration as dictatorial, Lincoln was in trouble.83  Against this 
                                                                                                             
 75 Id. 
 76 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
 77 MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE LAST BEST HOPE ON EARTH: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE 
PROMISE OF AMERICA 48 (Harvard University Press 1995). 
 78 See SAUL SIGELSCHIFFER, THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE: THE DRAMA OF THE 
LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 175 (1973). 
 79 See KUTLER, supra note 70, at 161–62. Five justices of the seven-member majority 
in Scott v. Sandford were appointed from slave states: Chief Justice Taney was appointed 
from Maryland; Justices Wayne, from Georgia; Justice Daniel, from Virginia; Justice 
Campbell, from Alabama; and Justice Catron, from Tennessee. THE SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES 111, 116, 126, 136, 161 (Clare Cushman ed., 
Congressional Quarterly 1995). 
 80 Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, First Annual Message to 
Congress (December 3, 1861). 
 81 “The country generally has outgrown our present judicial system. . . . Three 
modifications occur to me, either or which, I think, would be an improvement upon our 
present system. Let the Supreme Court be of convenient number in every event; then, 
first, let the whole country be divided into circuits of convenient size, the Supreme judges 
to serve in a number of them corresponding to their own number, and independent circuit 
judges be provided for all the rest; or, secondly, let the Supreme judges be relieved from 
circuit duties and circuit judge provided for all the circuits; or, thirdly, dispense with 
circuit courts altogether, leaving the judicial functions wholly to the district courts and an 
independent Supreme Court.”  Id. 
 82 See DAVID M. SILVER, LINCOLN’S SUPREME COURT 83 (Illinois Reissue 1998) 
(1956). 
 83 DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 380–82 (Simon & Schuster 1995). 
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background, the Supreme Court was close to deciding issues involving 
the administration’s war efforts.84  With public opinion shifting against 
Lincoln and the Republican Party,85 the administration could ill-afford a 
defeat by the Supreme Court, and thus looked to take the necessary steps 
to avoid calamity.86 
Politically, for Lincoln, having ten justices at his disposal was more 
“convenient” than nine, providing the assurances Lincoln’s 
administration needed.87  With the circuits directly tied to the number of 
justices on the Supreme Court, the creation of a Tenth Circuit provided a 
means for appointing a tenth justice.88  As a result, 1863 saw the 
enactment of the Tenth Circuit Act, incorporating California and Oregon 
into a Tenth Circuit,89 which two years later also incorporated Nevada.90 
                                                                                                             
 84 See id. at 84; Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) 
(determining whether President Lincoln had the authority to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus); The Amy Warwick, 1 F. Cas. 808, 809 (D. Mass. 1862), aff’d, 67 U.S. 635 (U.S. 
1863) (determining the constitutionality of President Lincoln’s blockade of Southern 
ports). 
 85 JAFFA, supra note 62, at 382. 
 86 See SILVER, supra note 82, at 92. In 1862, “with the [S]outh out of the Union, the 
dominant Republicans reconstructed the judicial system at the expense of the seceded 
states. In brief, they took the five judicial circuits that consisted entirely of slave states 
and telescoped them into three.”  KUTLER, supra note 70, at 62; Judiciary Act of 1862, 12 
Stat. 576  (stating that the First, Second and Third Circuits remained the same; Maryland, 
Delaware, Virginia and North Carolina constituted the Fourth Circuit; Alabama, Georgia, 
Florida, South Carolina and Mississippi constituted the Fifth Circuit; Louisiana, 
Arkansas, Texas, Kentucky and Tennessee constituted the Sixth Circuit; Ohio and 
Indiana constituted the Seventh Circuit; Michigan, Wisconsin and Illinois constituted the 
Eighth Circuit; Missouri, Iowa, Kansas and Minnesota constituted the Ninth Circuit). 
“The assignment of the states in the circuits was important because of the tradition of 
placing one representative from each circuit on the court.”  John V. Orth, How Many 
Judges Does It Take To Make A Supreme Court?, 19 CONST. COMMENTARY 681, 683 
(2002). 
 87 See SILVER, supra note 82, at 84.  In the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court 
determined the constitutionality of President Lincoln’s seizure of several ships under the 
blockade of Southern ports.  Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635 (1863).  By a small margin 
of five to four, the Supreme Court upheld Lincoln’s actions. Id. This decision was of 
immense importance, “if the blockade was legal, then Lincoln was not only engaged in a 
large-scale law enforcement action, he was engaged in a war. And along with this came 
whatever powers accrue to a military commander in dealing with hostile or contested 
territory and it inhabitants.”  DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 140 (The 
University of Chicago Press 2003). Lincoln’s small margin of victory emphasizes the 
tightrope his administration’s policies were walking and the benefit of another favorable 
voice on the Supreme Court. 
 88 See SILVER, supra note 82, at 84. 
 89 Tenth Circuit Act, 12 Stat. 794 (1863). 
 90 Act of Feb, 27, 1865, 13 Stat. 440 (1865). 
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G.  Judicial Circuits Act 
Although the end of the Civil War saw the reunification of the 
Southern and Northern states, their political interests remained at odds.91 
When a Southern Democrat, Andrew Johnson, took over the presidency 
upon Lincoln’s assassination, Republicans saw a stronghold of political 
power pulled out from underneath them.92  With a stronger political 
presence, Southern states instituted “black codes” in an attempt to restrict 
the freedoms of former slaves.93  As Republicans passed federal 
legislation against these “black codes,” constitutional challenges toward 
the reconstruction policies brought the federal judiciary into the 
conflict.94 
As Supreme Court rulings questioned the constitutionality of 
reconstruction legislation, the threat of southern political dominance over 
the Court took center stage once again.95  With growing skepticism 
toward both the Presidency and the Court,96 Congress passed the Judicial 
Circuits Act of 1866 to reduce the membership of the Supreme Court 
seats from nine to seven (upon vacancies),97 and the number of circuits 
from ten to nine.98 
                                                                                                             
 91 See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 72–73. 
 92 See BRUCE E. BAKER, WHAT RECONSTRUCTION MEANT: HISTORICAL MEMORY IN 
THE SOUTH 13 (University of Virginia 2007) (“developments were brought to a halt when 
President Andrew Jackson imposed easy terms on former Confederate leaders, allowing 
them to regain their lost lands and political control of the state.”). 
 93 Id. 
 94 See CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 419 
(Rothman & Co. 1987). 
 95 Id. at 429 (referring to Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (U.S. 1866)) (“The 
Indianapolis Journal said that the decision was ‘intended only to aid the Johnson men, 
and is so clearly a forerunner of other decisions looking to a defeat of Republican 
ascendancy and to a restoration of Southern domination.’”). 
 96 “Since it was openly stated that by the President and his supporters that the validity 
of any…[reconstruction] legislation would be challenged, it was evident that the Court 
might become the final arbiter of the situation.”  Id. at 422. 
 97 This reduction impeded Andrew Johnson’s opportunity to make appointments to 
the Supreme Court.  WARREN, supra note 94, at 422–23.  In 1863, after the Tenth Circuit 
Act, “the court had consisted of six Democrats and four Republicans.”  Id. at 422  In 
1864, upon the appointment of Justice Chase, “the Court had become evenly divided in 
political character; and after . . . [Justice] Catron had died, May 30, 1865, the Judges 
appointed by President Lincoln constituted a majority of the Court.”  Id. In 1866, after the 
death of Justice Catron, President Johnson had nominated, Henry Stanbery of Ohio, a 
Republican, to fill the vacancy.  Id.  “The Senate, however, was determined to curb the 
President in every move.”   Id.  To impede his opportunities to make judicial appointment 
to the Bench, the Senate passed the Judicial Circuits Act, which gradually eliminated 
seats on the Supreme Court until there would be seven justices. Id. at 423. 
 98 Judicial Circuits Act, 14 Stat. 209 (July 23, 1866). 
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Prior to the Judicial Circuits Act, a historic tradition of placing one 
representative from each circuit on the Supreme Court dictated the 
number of appointments to the Court; this system allowed Southern 
slave-owners to dominate the Supreme Court.99  Abandoning this 
tradition “lessened the demand and need for southern representation on 
the Supreme Court.”100  Furthermore, this reorganization was consistent 
with the efforts of Congressional Republicans to reduce the strong 
influence of southern states in the federal government, prior to the Civil 
War.101  The Judicial Circuits Act enabled Republicans to redraw the 
circuits so that the Fifth Circuit remained the only circuit composed 
exclusively of confederate states.102 
H.  Tenth Circuit Act of 1929 
Between 1867 and 1911, twelve states joined the Union and were 
incorporated into the existing nine circuits.103  During this period, a 
steady growth in business,104 coupled with increasing authority,105 
                                                                                                             
 99 Orth, supra note 86, at 683. 
 100 KUTLER, supra note 70, at 62. 
 101 See supra note 74. 
 102 KUTLER, supra note 70, at 61–62; Judicial Circuits Act, 14 Stat. 209 (1866) 
(stating that the First and Second Circuits remained the same; Pennsylvania, New Jersey 
and Delaware constituted the Third Circuit; West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina and 
South Carolina constituted the Fourth Circuit; Georgia Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, 
Louisiana and Texas constituted the Fifth Circuit; Ohio Michigan, Kentucky, and 
Tennessee constituted the Sixth Circuit; Indiana Illinois and Wisconsin constituted the 
Seventh Circuit; Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas and Arkansas constituted the Eighth 
Circuit; California, Oregon, and Nevada constituted the Ninth Circuit). 
 103 See Act of March 25, 1867, 15 Stat. 5 (1867) (adding Nebraska to the Eighth 
Circuit); Act of June 26, 1876, 19 Stat. 61 (1876) (adding Colorado to the Eighth 
Circuit); Act of February 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676 (1889)  (adding North Dakota and South 
Dakota to the Eighth Circuit, while adding Montana and Washington to the Ninth 
Circuit); Act of July 3, 1890, 26 Stat. 215 (1890) (adding Idaho to the Ninth Circuit); Act 
of July 10, 1890, 26 Stat. 222 (1890) (adding Wyoming to the Eighth Circuit); Act of 
July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107 (1894) (adding Utah to the Eighth Circuit); Act of June 16, 
1906, 34 Stat. 267 (1906) (adding Oklahoma to the Eighth Circuit); Act of February 14, 
1912, 37 Stat. 1729 (1912) (adding New Mexico to the Eighth Circuit and Arizona to the 
Ninth Circuit). 
 104 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 61–62 (“The National Banks Act of the 
sixties brought before the Supreme Court many new variations and applications of 
McCulloch v. Maryland. For a decade, the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 added considerably to 
the business of the district court and Supreme Court. War claims against the government 
led to the establishment of the modern Court of Claims. Soon appeals from the Court of 
Claims began to swell the Supreme Court docket. Finally, the political issues of the War 
begot legislation that for a time flooded the lower courts, and constitutional amendments 
that to this day are among the mains sources of the Supreme Court’s business. In the 
Southern federal courts, prosecutions under the Force Bills broke of their own weight; the 
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created circumstances where “the new tasks [of the federal judiciary] 
could not be absorbed by the old machinery.”106 Congress responded by 
enacting expansive measures to address these burdens.107 
By 1911, however, the Eighth Circuit encompassed thirteen states, 
“from Minnesota in the north to New Mexico in the south and from Iowa 
in the east to Utah in the west.”108  With the circuit dockets still 
congested, discussion about reform focused on the Eighth Circuit.109  In 
1927, an ABA committee submitted a proposal to realign all of the 
existing circuit boundaries, and in the process, create a new tenth circuit 
court.110  Opposition to this proposal came from several sectors,111 and 
Congress ultimately abandoned the ABA proposal in favor of one that 
would not necessitate the redrawing of all the circuits, but just one—the 
Eighth Circuit.112  As a result, Congress passed the Tenth Circuit Act of 
1929, splitting the Eighth Circuit in two and creating a Tenth Circuit for 
the second time in history.113 
                                                                                                             
Slaughter-House Cases introduced a steady torrent of cases under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 105 See Act of March 3, 18 Stat. 470 (1875). “In the Act of March 3, 1875, Congress 
gave the federal courts the vast range of power which had laid dormant in the 
Constitution since 1789. These courts…became the primary and powerful reliance for 
vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws, and treatise of the United 
States.”  FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 65. 
 106 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 69. 
 107 See Judiciary Act of 1869, 16 Stat. 44 (Apr. 10, 1869) (establishing separate 
judgeships for the U.S. circuit courts, and increased the seats on the Supreme Court back 
to nine. Under the Act, a circuit judge, the justice appointed to the circuit or the district 
judge could hold a circuit court, making possible the simultaneous meeting of circuit 
courts within a given circuit); Judiciary Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 826 (Mar. 3, 1891) (creating 
nine circuits with corresponding appellate courts known as the United States Circuit 
Courts of Appeals, which had jurisdiction over most appeals of lower court decisions. 
The Act also eliminated the requirement of “circuit riding” by Supreme Court Justices). 
 108 Thomas E. Baker, An Assessment of Past Extramural Reforms of the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 28 GA. L. REV. 863, 897–98 (1994). 
 109 Id. at 898. 
 110 Id. (identifying Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah and 
Washington as states proposed for the new Tenth Circuit). 
 111 Id. (“Opponents complained chiefly about switching states from one circuit to 
another and the consequent changes in the law, although buttressing arguments were 
heard: that the workload in the Eighth Circuit did not justify a division, that the bill 
would not adequately address the docket problem because it failed to create new 
judgeships, and that the one-to-one ratio of circuits to justices on the Supreme Court 
should not be abandoned.”). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Act of February 28, 1929, 45 Stat. 1346 (1929). Since this division, the Eighth 
Circuit has grown to encompass Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota; and the Tenth Circuit encompasses Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, 
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I.  Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980 
Between 1961 and 1963, as the Civil Rights Movement gained 
attention from the government and heightened public awareness, political 
pressure focused on the federal judiciary.114  Civil rights activists sought 
to concentrate their attention on the inequality of blacks in the South by 
challenging segregation laws and customs.115  These civil rights battles 
created a sharp divide in the judiciary between those who favored 
integration and those who opposed it.116  Conservative judges believed 
that ideals of “the Old South” were under attack by liberal federal court 
rulings,117 launching accusations that circuit court panels reviewing civil 
rights were intentionally composed of liberal judges to achieve an 
outcome favorable to progressive attitudes.118 
As civil rights cases swamped the Fifth Circuit docket, there was a 
need for remedial measures.119  Chief Judge Elbert Parr Tuttle of the 
United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit sought the assistance 
of Chief Justice Warren to help facilitate this needed change.120  In 
response, Chief Justice Warren authorized the appointment of a special 
Committee on the Geographical Organization of the Courts (known as 
the “Biggs Committee,” referencing the committee head, Third Circuit 
Judge John Biggs).121  It was the consensus of the Biggs Committee that 
any more than nine judges on a single court would impair efficiency.122 
Conversely, to meet its judicial demands, the Fifth Circuit needed at least 
                                                                                                             
Utah, and Wyoming. An Assessment of Past Extramural Reforms of the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 28 GA. L. REV. 863, 898 (1994). 
 114 See BARROW & WALKER, supra note 1, at 32. 
 115 See id. at 33. 
 116 See id. at 55. 
 117 See id. 
 118 See id. at 55–56. According to the Fifth Circuit’s Judge Elbert Tuttle, “the 
accusation of judge-stacking in regular court of appeals panels was misplaced. Though he 
did not deny that at least two of ‘the four’ liberals were assigned to each Mississippi civil 
rights case, he asserted that this was largely due to special circumstances facing the 
court.” Id. at 56. Of the court’s nine members, two were in poor health, Cameron and 
Hutcheson, and two were serving under recess appointments, Bell and Gewin. Id. at 57. 
 119 See BARROW & WALKER, supra note 1, at 64.   
 120 Id. at 2, 7 (“[A]ny request from the Fifth Circuit was certain to receive special 
attention from Earl Warren. Like Warren, over half of the Fifth Circuit judges had been 
appointed by Dwight Eisenhower. . . . A Liberal faction on the Fifth Circuit shared 
Warrens’ views on civil rights and formed a majority on many panels that rendered 
trailblazing civil rights decisions. Warren needed the support of the Fifth Circuit if his 
mandate in Brown v. Board of Education was to be enforced in the Deep South; and the 
Fifth Circuit in turn, needed the reinforcement of Warren’s court when its own directives 
were challenged on appeal.”). 
 121 BARROW & WALKER, supra note 1, at 8. 
 122 See id. at 64. 
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fifteen judges.123  The logical step was a division of the Fifth Circuit, but 
proposals to do so were based on more than just administrative 
concerns.124 
The recommendation of the Biggs Committee was to split the Fifth 
Circuit at the Mississippi River, a geographical configuration that would 
effectively separate the Fifth Circuit’s pro-civil rights jurists and 
undermine their influence;125 a staunch advocate of this proposal was 
James Eastland, a Mississippi Senator and devoted segregationist.126  
Certain “liberal judges” campaigned against the division of the circuit, 
believing it would have adverse consequences on civil rights.127  By 
1964, despite concerns over efficiency, politics engulfed the division 
debate and impeded all proposals.128 
To handle the caseload, absent a division, the Fifth Circuit’s bench 
swelled to twenty-six judges by 1978, far above the Biggs Committees’ 
recommended number of nine.129  The increased number of judgeships 
did not “settle the realignment controversy; it was simply a vehicle to 
break the legislative standoff.  It permitted both sides in the 
congressional battle to create the needed judgeships without conceding 
their respective oppositions on division.”130  Workload continued to 
increase, and by 1979, the Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals received more 
than 4,200 cases per year.131 
By 1980, all of the Fifth Circuit judges unanimously agreed that a 
division of the circuit was necessary.132  However, the undisputed 
                                                                                                             
 123 See id. 
 124 See id. 
 125 Id at 65. Under this recommendation, the new Fifth Circuit would contain 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia and Mississippi; the new Eleventh Circuit would contain 
Louisiana and Texas.  Id. “At the time, to divide east and west of the Mississippi River 
meant that the Fifth Circuit’s four staunch pro-civil rights jurists . . . [ (Wisdom, 
appointed from Louisiana; Rives, appointed from Alabama; Brown, appointed from 
Texas; and Tuttle, appointed from Georgia)] would be separated.”  Id. at 11–14, 16–17, 
22–24, 65. 
 126 BARROW & WALKER, supra note 1, at 68. 
 127 See id. at 65, 88. 
 128 See id. at 63-68, 121. 
 129 Id. at 1, 64. 
 130 See id. at 219. For example, during President Jimmy Carter’s administration, 
judges appointed to the bench were part of an initiative towards “opening up the bench to 
women and minorities and selecting nominees on the basis of merit.” BARROW & 
WALKER, supra note 1, at 225.  However, “there was some speculation, fueled by the 
unanimous response of the new judges and intention of the congressional leadership to 
keep the circuit whole, that during the confirmation process the Carter appointees had 
made commitment to oppose division.” Id. at 229. 
 131 BARROW & WALKER, supra note 1, at 233. 
 132 See id. at 236. 
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agreement among judges was not enough, as civil rights remained a 
strong deterrent to the division of the circuit.133  “Although conditions in 
1980 were a far cry from those of the early 1960s, assertions alone might 
not be enough to convince key members of Congress that something 
sinister was not afoot. Simply put, too much political baggage remained 
from years past.”134  The division ultimately necessitated another 
campaign by judges, but this time to alleviate the civil rights concerns, 
not arouse them.135  The Fifth Circuit judges encouraged civil rights 
activists to lobby members of Congress and judges who were members 
of racial minorities to argue their position with Congress.136  Fears finally 
subsided on October 14, 1980, when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Reorganization Act divided the Fifth Circuit and led to the birth of a new 
Eleventh Circuit.137 
J.  The Ninth Circuit Dilemma 
The Ninth Circuit is currently composed of nine states and two U.S. 
territories: Alaska, Arizona, California, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, 
Washington, Idaho, Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands.138  
Dwarfing “its fellow circuit courts in caseload, population, number of 
states, and number of judges,”139 the sheer enormity of this circuit raises 
questions of efficiency and practically.  However, as reformation is 
proposed and debated on the national stage,140 objective criteria continue 
to take a back seat to subjective concerns. 
                                                                                                             
 133 See id. at 237–38. 
 134 Id. at 238. 
 135 Id. at 238–39. 
 136 Id. at 237–39. 
 137 Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act, 94 Stat. 1994 (1980). 
 138 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2009). 
 139 John M. Roll, The 115 Year-Old Ninth Circuit: Why A Split Is Necessary And 
Inevitable, 7 WYO. L. REV. 109 (2007). 
 140 See Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 2003, S. 562, 108th 
Cong. (2003) (splitting the Ninth Circuit into two, with California and Nevada remaining 
in the Ninth Circuit and all other Ninth Circuit jurisdictions being assigned to a new 
Twelfth Circuit); Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judgeship and Reorganization Act of 
2003, H.R. 2723, 108th Cong. (2003) (splitting the Ninth Circuit into two, with Arizona, 
California and Nevada remaining in the Ninth Circuit and all other Ninth Circuit 
jurisdictions being assigned to a new Twelfth Circuit); Ninth Circuit Judgeship and 
Reorganization Act of 2005, H.R. 211, 109th Cong. (2005) (creating two new circuits, 
the Twelfth and Thirteenth. The Ninth Circuit would consist of California, Hawaii, 
Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands. The Twelfth Circuit would consist of Arizona, 
Nevada, Idaho, and Montana. The Thirteenth Circuit would consist of Alaska, Oregon, 
and Washington); Circuit Court of Appeals Restructuring and Modernization Act of 
2005, S. 1845, 109th Cong. (2005) (splitting the Ninth Circuit into two, with California, 
Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands remaining in the Ninth Circuit, and all 
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The size of the Ninth Circuit cannot be understated. Encompassing 
more states than any other, the circuit’s jurisdiction extends to over 1.3 
million square miles of American soil—nearly 40% of the entire 
country.141  With a population of about 31 million, the circuit’s populace 
is twice the size of the Sixth Circuit.142  To cope with this size, the Ninth 
Circuit “has 28 authorized judgeships, which is 11 more than the second 
largest circuit.”143  If the present statistics were not staggering enough, 
consider the fact that the United States Census Bureau projects that the 
Ninth Circuit “will grow even more, both in absolute terms and relative 
to the other circuits, between 2000 and 2030.”144 
The Ninth Circuit’s enormity creates several functional problems.  
From start to finish, an appeal in the Ninth Circuit can take four months 
longer than the average appeal time in other Courts of Appeals.145  Due 
to the Circuit’s vast number of judges, the Ninth Circuit abandons 
traditional en banc hearings146 in favor of problematic “limited en banc” 
hearings.147  Even after a final judgment, the Ninth Circuit’s problems 
                                                                                                             
other Ninth Circuit jurisdictions being assigned to new Twelfth Circuit); Circuit Court of 
Appeals Restructuring and Modernization Act of 2007, S. 525, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(amending Title 28, United States Code, to provide for the appointment of additional 
Federal circuit judges and to divide the Ninth Judicial Circuit of the United States into 
two circuits: the Ninth Circuit, composed of California, Guam, Hawaii, and the Northern 
Mariana Islands; and the Twelfth Circuit, composed of Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, Oregon, and Washington). 
 141 Legislative Proposals to Split the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit: Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (Statement of 
Rachel L. Brand), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/pdf/ninth_circuit_split_aag_ 
brand_testimony.pdf. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 3. 
 144 Id. at 2. 
 145 Examining the Proposal to Restructure the Ninth Circuit: Hearing on S. 1845 
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Diarmuid 
O’Scannlain, Circuit Judge), http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=2071 
&wit_id=3263 (last visited October 10, 2009) (The Ninth Circuit’s enormous size . . . 
creates problems for our litigants. In my court, the median time from when a party 
activates an appeal to when it receives resolution is over sixteen-and-a-half months—
almost four months longer than the average for the rest of the Courts of Appeals.”). 
 146 Pamela Ann Rymer, How Big Is Too Big?, 15 J. L. & POLITICS 383, 387 (1999) 
(“By statute, federal appellate courts may rehear a case, decided in the first instance by a 
panel of three judges, en banc (literally, ‘full bench’), for three purposes: to decide issues 
of exceptional importance, to resolve intra-circuit conflict, and to avoid inter-circuit 
conflict.”). 
 147 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (“[A limited en banc hearing] shall consist of the Chief Judge of 
this circuit and 10 additional judges to be drawn by lot from the active judges of the 
Court. In the absence of the Chief Judge, an 11th active judge shall be drawn by lot, and 
the most senior active judge on the panel shall preside.”); see also Pamela Ann Ryme, 
Symposium, The Ninth Circuit Conference: The En Banc Court: The “Limited” En 
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are not over—its decisions face the highest reversal rate of any circuit.148 
Despite these administrative issues, as of 2005, only three of the Ninth 
Circuit’s 24 judges favored dividing the Circuit.149  Some of the judges 
even argue that the court’s “administrative efficiency is second to 
none.”150  Nevertheless, the dilemma facing the Ninth Circuit is that 
while functional concerns exist, other interests are present, causing 
politics to penetrate the debate and galvanize both those who stand in 
favor of reformation, and those who oppose it. 
In advocating legislation to divide the Ninth Circuit,151 members of 
Congress have expressly stated “desire to reduce the number of 
‘extreme’ (as opposed to ‘mainstream’) judicial decisions.”152  For 
example, Rep. Rick Renzi (R-AZ) stated that the Ninth Circuit’s 
“contemptuous judgments tear at the moral fabric of our nation, 
disregard the will of the people and force a corrupt ideology upon our 
society.”153 
                                                                                                             
Banc: Half Full, or Half Empty? 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 321 (2006)  (“[O]f ninety-five en 
bancs resolved on the merits between 1999 and 2005, there were nine cases where at least 
as many Ninth Circuit judges (in en banc dissents and the panel majority) signed opinions 
that reach the opposite result on at least one issue as signed the limited en banc majority 
decision. In other words, a majority of a limited en banc panel can produce a result that is 
contrary to the known views of the same number, or a greater number, of judges.”). 
 148 Kevin M. Scott, Supreme Court Reversals of the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 
341 (2006) (“Over the past twenty-one Supreme Court terms (since the Fifth Circuit was 
split), the Ninth Circuit has been reversed an average of 14.48 times, with the next closest 
circuit (the ‘new’ Fifth) reversed 5.14 times per term over the same time period. This 
disparity grows even greater if one considers that the Supreme Court’s caseload has been 
decreasing steadily since the late 1980s.”). 
 149 Revisiting Proposals to Split the Ninth Circuit: An Inevitable Solution to a 
Growing Problem Before the S. Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts, 109th 
Cong. 1 (2005) (Testimony of Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judge) available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1635&wit_id=4729 (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2009). 
 150 See id. (quoting a letter written by Circuit Judge Carlos Bea of San Francisco). 
 151 Protecting the Ten Commandments and Other Expressions of Faith, 
http://www.house.gov/simpson/issues-protecting.shtml (last visited Feb 5, 2008) (Rep. 
Mike Simpson, R-ID, expresses his displeasure with the Ninth Circuit decisions); Ninth 
Circuit Court Needs To Be Split Up, http://ensign.senate.gov/issleg/issues/record.cfm? 
id=261720& (last visited Feb. 5, 2008) (Senator Ensign stating that the Ninth Circuit 
“consistently manifests a leftward tilt in a region of the country that is among the most 
conservative.”). 
 152 Brian Fitzpatrick, Disorder in the Court, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 2007, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-fitzpatrick11jul11,0,6274474.story?coll=la-
opinion-rightrail (last visited November 27, 2009). 
 153 Id. (“The people of Arizona would be better served under the jurisdiction of a 
separate court, one that recognizes our family values and defends our core beliefs.”). 
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These motivations are the product of the Ninth Circuit’s reputation 
as one of the most liberal circuits in the country.154  In Brown v. 
California Department of Transportation, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the 
California Department of Transportation could not allow American flags 
to be placed on state highway overpasses without permits unless the 
agency did the same for antiwar signs.155  In Newdow v. United States 
Congress, the Ninth Circuit took another “liberal” stance, holding that 
the Pledge of Allegiance was unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment due to its inclusion of the phrase “under God.”156 
The aforementioned cases are just a sampling of decisions from the 
Ninth Circuit that have enraged conservative politicians.157  However, 
legitimate concerns over the circuit date back to over a century ago.158 
Today, “political controversy has regenerated this issue into a large-scale 
debate.”159 
II. THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN CIRCUIT DISTRICTING 
Facing the prospect of dividing the Ninth Circuit, Justice Kennedy 
sets forth two rationales for restructuring federal judicial circuits: either 
                                                                                                             
 154 Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth 
Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 408 (“One reads about a court that is ‘big, 
feisty and liberal,’ a ‘renegade court’ that includes ‘one of the last unabashed liberals,’ 
and many ‘colorful’ judges . . . .”); Roll, supra note 139 at 121 (citing Jonathon D. 
Glater, Lawmakers Trying Again to Divide Ninth Circuit, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005, at 
116) (“Chief Judge Schroeder attributed efforts to split the Ninth Circuit to 
‘dissatisfaction in some areas with some of our decisions.’  She said: ‘This has a long 
historic basis beginning with some fishing-rights decisions in the ‘60s and going forward 
to the Pledge of Allegiance case and . . . some of the immigration decisions.’”). 
 155 Brown v. Cal. DOT, 321 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 156 Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 157 See Frank Tamulonis III, Comment, Splitting the Ninth Circuit: An Administrative 
Necessity or Environmental Gerrymandering?, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 859, 863 (2008) 
(“Cases involving issues such as timber harvests in the Northwest, fishing rights in 
Alaska, and the death penalty in California have angered many conservatives. The Ninth 
Circuit recently decided that the government likely lacked the power to ban medical use 
of marijuana.”). 
 158 See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflection Seventy-Five 
Years After The Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1643, 1654–55 (2000) (citing 21 
Cong. Rec. 20,228 (1890)) (“In a remark demonstrating that arguments for dividing the 
Ninth Circuit are nothing new, Senator Dolph stated, ‘I do not wish to interfere with any 
other locality, but I assert what every one must and does know who knows anything 
about the history of the country, that California, Oregon, and Washington should not be 
in one circuit, with all their vast coast line and with the great amount of admiralty 
business there is in the courts of those districts.’”). 
 159 Crystal Marchesoni, Comment, United We Stand, Divided We Fall?: The 
Controversy Surrounding a Possible Division of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1263, 1284 (2005). 
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objective notions of efficiency or political motivations.160  Justice 
Kennedy contrasts these twin rationales as “right” and “wrong,” using 
the latter to describe political motivations.161  However, the history of the 
circuit system does not appear to illustrate an institution isolated from 
political influences; instead, as a direct result of political disputes, the 
federal circuit system developed and progressed.162 
A.  The Presence of Politics 
During the United States’ infancy, conflict erupted over 
philosophies of governance.163  One of the tools utilized in this political 
tug-of-war was the federal judicial circuit system.  For Federalists, 
judicial circuits, with the use of circuit riding, served as a means to 
promote the federal government.164  As the Federalists’ control over the 
government diminished, the party’s expansion of the judicial circuits 
became an attempt to preserve their political ideology.165 
For Republicans, however, Federalists threatened the very essence 
of the American Revolution—independence.166  As the Republicans 
gained control over the federal government, judicial circuits yielded to a 
philosophy of state sovereignty.167  While Republicans did not contract 
the number of judicial circuits, political hostilities remained for over 
twenty years as seven states entered the Union while remaining outside 
the judicial circuit system.168 
In the mid 19th century, politics influenced judicial circuits once 
again.169  The United States’ North and South developed into two distinct 
regions, diverging in social, economic, and political perspectives.  As the 
countervailing interests of the North resulted in legislative efforts, 
Southern states relied on the federal judiciary to protect their interests 
and impede Northern initiatives.170 
                                                                                                             
 160 Rehberg: Ninth Circuit’s Size Leaves Montana Out, 
http://www.house.gov/list/press/mt00_rehberg/030907_9thCircuit.html (last visited 
November 27, 2009) (citing Justice Kennedy). Justice Kennedy stated in a congressional 
hearing, “you don’t design a circuit around [politics]. . . . That would be quite wrong. 
You design it for other objective, neutral, and efficient reasons.”  Id. 
 161 See id. 
 162 See supra Part III. 
 163 Id. 
 164 FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 19. 
 165 See supra notes 31–35. 
 166 See supra notes 25–30. 
 167 See supra notes 44–47. 
 168 See supra Part I. 
 169 See supra notes 63–68. 
 170 See KUTLER, supra note 71, at 14–15. 
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Upon taking office, President Lincoln expressed his desire to 
restructure the circuit system, recognizing the inefficiencies and politics 
within the federal judiciary.171  However, as a president confronted with 
civil war, once the Supreme Court threatened his administration’s war 
efforts, neutral proposals towards improvements upon the circuit system 
took a backseat to President Lincoln’s political agenda.172  Like those 
before him, President Lincoln played politics with circuit boundaries; 
restructuring the circuits to achieve political objectives, thus preventing 
potential frustration to the Union’s war powers.173 
Even after the Civil War, politics remained in the forefront of the 
circuit structure.174  With a Southern Democrat in office and a Supreme 
Court threatening the constitutionality of reconstruction legislation, old 
fears and hostilities generated a need for political recourse.175  For 
Republicans, the benefit yielded by a reorganization of judicial circuits 
was twofold: impeding President Johnson’s judicial appointments and 
realigning all the remaining circuits producing courts sympathetic to 
reconstruction programs.176 
While political climates have been catalysts for changing judicial 
circuits, they have also served as impediments.177  For decades during the 
20th century, neutral objectives of efficiency mandated a division of the 
Fifth Circuit.178  However, what unfolded was the maintenance of an 
inefficient Fifth Circuit to achieve political ends.179  “Liberal” judges 
campaigned against this division not out of objective notions of 
functionality, but based on sympathy towards the Civil Rights 
Movement.180  It was not until two decades later, upon the alleviation of 
concerns over civil rights that Congress restructured the Fifth Circuit.181 
Although the various aforementioned political climates were 
influential in the redrawing of federal judicial circuits, it is unreasonable 
to generalize that politics are always a dominating factor.  In 1929, 
Congress divided the Eighth Circuit in an attempt to remedy a bloated 
                                                                                                             
 171 See supra note 82. 
 172 See supra  Part II. 
 173 See supra notes 86–88; PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
183 (Penguin Books 2006) (1999). 
 174 Id. at 10–16. 
 175 Id. at 10–12. 
 176 Id. at 11–12. 
 177 Id. at 13–16. 
 178 Id. at 14–16. 
 179 Id. at 14–15. 
 180 See id. “Liberal” judges feared the potential impact of having “conservative” 
judges in full control of a circuit. BARROW & WALKER, supra note 1, at 141–45. 
 181 BARROW & WALKER, supra note 1, at 244–45. 
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circuit’s lack of efficiency.182  However, while this legislative initiative 
did not directly implicate a political agenda, “it would be a mistake to 
forget that whenever governmental power is wielded, politics is 
present.”183 
The United States’ legislative branch is a bicameral congress, 
composed of the Senate, which represents interests of each of the fifty 
states; and the House of Representatives, which represents the interests 
of each of the 435 congressional districts.184  A process of compromise 
must inhere in a legislative system that embraces diversity of national 
opinions and interests.  If each democratically elected official attempts to 
represent the interests of his or her constituency, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to disallow politics from playing a role in legislative efforts. 
B.  Political Correctness 
In establishing our Constitution, the Founding Fathers left structural 
components, such as the creation of lower federal courts, to the will of 
politicians.185  As illustrated by the history of circuit boundaries, 
encompassed in this power to create is the right to do so advantageously, 
within constitutional limitations.  Politically motivated changes are likely 
viewed as “wrong” due to notions of an independent judiciary.186  
However, this view is shortsighted when one distinguishes between 
independence and judicial independence. 
It might be easy to romanticize judicial independence, thinking of 
the concept simply in terms of a dictionary’s definition of 
independence.187  But, in actuality, the independence of the judiciary is 
far narrower.188  The Constitution confers elected representatives several 
                                                                                                             
 182 See supra at 13. 
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powers over the Federal Judiciary,189 and only in a very limited sense is 
the Federal Judiciary “independent.”190 
Acknowledging these limitations is not to say independence is 
unimportant; society needs the judiciary to maintain some semblance of 
autonomy so judges can ignore outside influences and maintain the “rule 
of law.”191  Yet, as a branch of government, the judiciary should remain 
responsive to the needs of the public it serves.192  With these two 
principles standing on opposite ends of the spectrum, the trick is striking 
a balance between the two, achieving an equilibrium in which our 
democratic republic can function.193 
To label the influence of politics simply as “wrong” is misguided.194  
Our government is too complex for such a simplistic characterization.195  
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Politically motivated alterations to the circuit system may not coincide 
with idealizations of the federal judiciary, but they are part of a process 
to achieve a functional balance of power within our government.196  
Regardless of suspicions, today, after a history of political influences, the 
Federal Judiciary is not one engulfed by chaos and corruption; it is an 
example that the world’s democracies strive to follow.197 
II. CONCLUSION 
From the birth of the United States to the present day, politics has 
played a role in most, if not all, changes to the federal government’s 
system of judicial circuits.198  What began as a means for the Founding 
Fathers to end debates over the structure of the Federal Judiciary, it then 
produced an inherent power in the legislature that merged politics with a 
system of lower federal courts.199  This grant of power echoed through 
history as political leaders, from the Civil War to the Civil Rights 
Movement, utilized judicial circuits as mechanisms for reform.200 
As rulings from the Ninth Circuit give way to perceptions of liberal 
extremism, communities that do not share in the opinions of the circuit 
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are concerned.201  Motivated by these concerns, members of Congress 
continue to propose legislation aimed at dividing the Ninth Circuit.202  
When confronted with the potential of witnessing the first realignment of 
federal judicial circuits in over twenty-five years, Justice Kennedy made 
his attitude clear.203  He stated that, “you don’t design a circuit around 
[politics]. . . . That would be quite wrong. You design it for other 
objective, neutral, and efficient reasons.”204 
The existing problem is that Justice Kennedy’s classification 
oversimplifies a complicated issue.  The United States’ federal 
government is a “government of the people, by the people, for the 
people.”205  To label “wrong” any action of an elected representative, 
who (within constitutional limits) seeks to carry out the will of her 
constituency, oversimplifies the matter.  Such a label ignores not only the 
complexity of the federal government, but the history that embodies it. 
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